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8 Aug 2019: B S : Na, A, B,{|Na, A, B|}Ka, Nb,{|Na, A, B|}Kb3. ... 4: Na, {|Na, Kab|}Ka. Figure 4. A bad variant of Otway-Rees.

8 Aug 2019: Kb4. B A : Na,{|Na, Kab|}Ka. Informally, (1) A contacts B, generating Na to identify the run. ... The only secure part of message 4 is its encrypted part, {|Na, Kab|}Ka.

22 Aug 2019: Archaeology at Cambridge. 2009–2010. McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. ContactsMcDonald Institute for Archaeological ResearchDowning Street, Cambridge, CB2 3ER, UKwww.mcdonald.cam.ac.ukReception 44 (0)1223 333538Graeme Barker

22 Aug 2019: Archaeology at Cambridge. 2009–2010. McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. ContactsMcDonald Institute for Archaeological ResearchDowning Street, Cambridge, CB2 3ER, UKwww.mcdonald.cam.ac.ukReception 44 (0)1223 333538Graeme Barker

8 Aug 2019: client hello. Nb,Sid,Pb. server hello. cert(B,Kb). server certificate. cert(A,Ka). client certificate. ... certificate A KA == Crypt(priK Server){|Agent A, Key KA|}". 4.4 Client Messages.

8 Aug 2019: A,B,Na, A,B,Na,B,C,Nb,. A,B,Na,B,C,Nb,C,S,Nc,. {Kab,B,Na}Ka. {Kab,B,Na}Ka. ... A,Nb}Kb,. {Kab,B,Na}Ka. {Kbc,C,Nb}Kb,{Kab,A,Nb}Kb,. {Kcs,S,Nc}Kc,{Kbc,B,Nc}Kc,. Recursive Authentication Protocol 4 L.

8 Aug 2019: Agent A, Agent B,. • Nonce Na, Nonce Nb,. • Key Ka, Key Kb, Key Kab. • ... S A : {|B, Kab, Na, Nb|}Ka,{|A, Kab|}Kb4. A B : {|A, Kab|}Kb,{|Nb|}Kab.

8 Aug 2019: S. A. 2: Na, A, B, {|Na, A, B|}Ka,Nb, {|Na, A, B|}Kb. ... 4: Na, {|Na, Kab|}Ka. 9 L. C. Paulson. 7. Formalization of Message 2.

7 Nov 2019: C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y. REPORTERS p e c i a l N o 2 W e d n e s d ay 6 N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 9 Vol c l. P U B L I S H E D B Y A U T H O R I T Y. R O L L O F T H E R E G E N T H O U S E A N D L I S T O F M E M B E R S O F T H E FA C U

30 Aug 2019: 2. 1 (i) If A > 0 and N is a positive integer, define KA,N : T2 R by. ... and1. (2π)2. T2. KA,N (s, t) ds dt = 1. By considering functions of the form.