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9 Jul 2023: XA. G(XA X. B) = log |J. B-B. - | -log |JB. ... 2log |J. B-B-| -. 1. 2log | J. B-B--J. B-A-JA-A--1JA-B-. |. I(XA; X. B) =. 1. 2log | J. BB| -. 1.

9 Jul 2023: Page 11. B. B. C D. $8. $9. $15. Total Exposures = $38. ... Page 24. B. B. C D. $8. $9. $15. Total Exposures = $38.

8 Dec 2023: consider: f {(G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}.26 The production subgame following f = (G,G). ... G,G), (G,B), (B,B)}. First, consider the game following f = (G,G).

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9 Jul 2023: to maximise Epeρτg(pτHS ). Let B. be the optimal stopping set; we will show that B = B. ... Proof Suppose ĥ0 = b′ > b and ξ0 = 0, and let T denote the first time ĥ hits b.

9 Jul 2023: USAHCoP-r SAQI-W2 SAQI-Cliqβ p LB B&B tall troot LB B&B tall troot NZ LB B&B tall troot NZ. ... constraint. SAQI-W2 SAQI-Minn β p LB B&B tall troot NZ p LB B&B tall troot NZ.

9 Jul 2023: H9! CMC9?B(:#_B NO(<8(<9!;:6aIK9! C!#"$N8(:;:8":N?b8(:9?;:6BNcedf-,/.1032#465]4(:WBE9!HL# CR(<!#"$g":IhN?"$89!A>:(/B >:Nb#8Hi"$N?N! ... 5? ,''%9@ 6 ')fBW@i@W?b? '#@fB? :U@ 6 'bHK%X);?AY['#B;B='#B BE<> <DQZ:) @=?a@ 6?

9 Jul 2023: S L XR b b b bR R R RR. USSt. ... X S R R L Lb b b bX X X X.

12 Dec 2023: Πi(b)|b=1 = ψ[pi(0,1) MCi(0)]2 (25). So profits under the CBAM are higher if and only if:. ... Πi(b)|b=1 Πi(ϕG) ψ[pi(0,1) MCi(0)]2. [ψ[pi(0,0) MCi(0)]2 ϕGτiei. ](26). To first order (omitting second-order terms in τi),

5 Dec 2023: p = po b(2β b). 2β 3bεw. (28). 4.2 The Contract Market. ... Working Paper, Department of Economics, Göteborg University and. Yale University. Hoogwijka, M., B.