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Governing Multiple Firms. Alex Edmans. LBS, CEPR, and ECGI. Doron Levit. Wharton. Devin Reilly. UPenn. September 1, 2016. Abstract. Conventional wisdom is that, when an investor owns multiple firms, governance is. weaker because she is spread too

the informational content of endogenous trading times (e.g. Li et al. ... 2004), among others. As endogenous sampling times contribute to the overall variation of our.

Finally, we propose a robust identification to the endogenous relationship between director network connections and firm value.

robust identification to the endogenous relationship between director network. connections and firm value.

imperfectly informed investors, together with an endogenous influx of new investors,.

How do they affect thefirm’s policies? Outline. I Dynamic structural model with endogenous investment andfinancing (with long–term debt with no covenants) decided byshareholders, who deviate from firm value maximization.

2. but are limited, because they do not allow for endogenous means of payment. ... tion of the general model with arbitrary cash constraints. We show that there is endogenous selection.

fewer of them will be available. Of course, safe asset scarcity must be an endogenous phenomenon. ... endogenous changes in uninformed demand. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) also analyze the equilibrium supply of riskless debt in a setting.

Lorenzo Ductor, Middlesex); Complexity, institutions and endogenous fragility (Matthew. Elliott, Cambridge) and Theory and experiments on network formation (Sanjeev Goyal,.

In this way,. uncertainty aversion generates endogenous contagion and becomes a source of systemic risk. ... 2.2 Endogenous Beliefs. An important implication of uncertainty aversion is that the investors’belief on the parameter θ.